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Abstract 
 
Searching for sustainable regional trade agreements (RTAs) for East Asia, we quantitatively 
evaluated the likely impact of proposed East Asian RTA strategies─(i) the AFTA (a being-left-
alone strategy), (ii) an ASEAN Hub RTA (a hub-and-spoke type of overlapping RTA strategy), 
(iii) the AFTA vs a China-Japan-Korea RTA (a duplicating or competing RTA strategy), (iv) 
an ASEAN+3 RTA (an expansionary RTA strategy)─on the East Asian economies and the 
world economy with respect to consumption, production, volume of trade, and terms of trade 
effect by applying a multi-country and multi-sector CGE model. We found that there was no 
perfectly Pareto improving RTA strategy among the four different scenarios proposed for East 
Asia relative to the existing AFTA. However, the expansionary ASEAN+3 RTA can be a 
sustainable Pareto efficient policy option because the members’ gains were significantly 
positive enough with more evenly distributed gains between members. The effects on world 
welfare were also positive enough and the negative effect on nonmembers was not very 
significant. More interestingly, if the East Asian countries are willing to cooperate with their 
Pacific Basin partners to form an APEC level of RTA, the evolution toward a global trade bloc 
can be counted as a Pareto improvement for East Asian economies in every aspect we 
measure. 
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I. Introduction 
 
East Asia1 has been making very rapid progress in market-driven regionalization.2 
Since the financial crisis occurred in 1997, East Asian effort to achieve regional economic 
cooperation has been very aggressive resulting in a proliferation of regionalism in East Asia. 
In particular, negotiating regional trade agreements (RTAs), mostly the result of the formation 
of bilateral free trade areas (FTAs) like a Singapore-Korea and a Japan-Malaysia FTA, and 
some plulilateral or multilateral FTAs like an ASEAN-China and an ASEAN-Korea FTA, are 
very common in the region. Accordingly, quite a few studies have dealt with East Asian 
regionalism focusing on why it is proliferating, what the likely impact of East Asian RTAs 
will be, and whether East Asian RTAs can lead us to global free trade or not.3 However, they 
do not ask whether the existing or proposed East Asian RTAs will be sustainable in the long 
run. In other words, none of existing studies quantitatively analyzes if there exist sustainable 
RTAs for East Asia in a globalizing world among the major RTAs considered in East Asia. 
As a prerequisite, for the sustainability of RTAs, the effectiveness of a policy for 
participating countries is a necessary condition to be satisfied. To be an effective RTA, the 
RTA should create a significant enough positive welfare effect on all the participating member 
countries and evenly distribute the gains from free trade between members as we consider the 
welfare gains that are not transferable across borders. Next, what is the sufficient condition 
for sustainability? The RTA should create positively enough static and dynamic effects on 
world welfare leading the RTAs to nondiscriminatory global free trade as Bhagwati (1993) 
indicates. Otherwise, the RTA will easily stall and be ineffective as time passes. Last but not 
least, the sustainable RTA could be more desirable provided that the Pareto efficiency holds. If 
not, there will be no incentive for possible members of an RTA to start negotiation for any 
alternative evolution of RTAs and to trigger the domino effect of regionalism4 by moving 
from an existing trade bloc to another.  
Even though most existing studies have missed examining sustainability, there are 
some exceptions. The global welfare gains from East Asian RTAs have been tested by Lee and 
                                            
1 In this paper, we narrowly define East Asia by including ASEAN 10 countries in Southeast 
Asia and China, Japan, and Korea in Northeast Asia. In addition, we treat the ASEAN 10 
countries as an economy. Thus there exist 4 individual East Asian economies in this paper, 
namely ASEAN+3 including ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea. 
2 For the market-driven regionalization, see Urata (2006). 
3 For proliferating RTAs in East Asia, see JETRO (2003), Lu (2003), Kawai (2004), 
Feridhanusetyawan (2005), and Lee and Park (2005). 
4 See Baldwin (1993). 
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Shin (2006) with a gravity regression analysis and by Park (2006) with a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model analysis for East Asian economies as a whole. However, they have 
not evaluated effectiveness, as a prerequisite, by analyzing the welfare effect on each 
economy in East Asia and then they have ignored an examination of the possible Pareto 
improvement. Our work, described in this paper, is an attempt to fill this gap by empirically 
testing the sustainability of possible East Asian RTAs. 
Each of the East Asian countries may consider the following four different RTA 
strategies: (i) no further effort to liberalize the regional market and then the existing AFTA 
will be activated in the region (“being-left-alone strategy”); (ii) the ASEAN+1 approach will 
likely completed as Japan successfully forms an RTA with ASEAN soon and then builds an 
ASEAN Hub RTA web including an ASEAN+China, an ASEAN+Japan, and an 
ASEAN+Korea FTA (“hub-and-spoke type5 of overlapping RTA strategy”); (iii) the N
Asian three countries will form their own separate RTA competing against ASEAN, that is, 
the AFTA versus a China-Japan-Korea FTA (“duplicating or competing RTA strategy
the ASEAN, as a whole, and the three Northeast Asian countries cooperate with each other 
form an East Asian FTA, that is, ASEAN+3 RTA (“expansionary RTA strategy”).  
 Searc
ortheast 
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strategy? In order to find the answer, we should consider interests of all the parties involv
individually and altogether. In this paper, we describe our quantitative test of the sustainabilit
of proposed East Asian RTAs with respect to the above-mentioned four conditions: (i) 
country-specific gains, (ii) distribution of gains between members, (iii) global welfare g
and (iv) Pareto efficiency. More specifically, we quantitatively evaluate the likely effect of the
proposed strategies on the East Asian economies with respect to the equivalent variation of 
welfare, GDP, exports, imports, and income terms of trade by applying a multi-country and 
multi-sector CGE model.6 The CGE model analysis has an advantage in measuring the 
welfare effect directly and in comparing the possible outcomes of different scenarios wh
maintaining logical consistency even though the complicated ex-ante simulation methodolog
sometimes mis-specifies the model economy. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Sec
characteristics of East Asian RTAs and of the debated issues about proliferating RTAs in East 
 
5 For the general concept of the hub-and-spoke RTAs, see Lloyd (2002), Umemoto (2003), 
and Baldwin (2004). 
6 For East Asian RTAs with CGE models, see McKibbin (1998), Scollay and Gilbert (2001), 
Urata and Kiyota (2003), McKibbin, Lee, and Cheong (2004), Sulamaa and Widgrén (2005), 
Zhai (2006), Park (2006), and Kawai and Wignaraja (2007). 
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Asia. Section III introduces the CGE model adopted, data used, and ex-ante scenarios 
designed. Section IV quantitatively measures the effects of the proposed East Asian RT
strategies and evaluates the sustainability. Section V presents concluding remarks with polic
implications. 
 
As’ 
y 
I. Regional Trade Agreements in East Asia 
. Main Characteristics of East Asian RTAs 
Both intra- and inter-regional trade agreements are proliferating in East Asia as 
shown i  been 
 or eliminating trade barriers between members is 
lization 
fter 
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ring the 
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n Table 1. As of September 2007, 21 RTAs have been implemented, 8 RTAs have
signed, and more than three dozen RTAs are being negotiated or considered by East Asian 
countries. There are some distinguishing characteristics that we may derive from the RTAs 
including countries in East Asia.  
 First, this trend of reducing
relatively new in East Asia. Most of the East Asian countries, especially countries in 
Northeast Asia, have been well-known to prefer nondiscriminatory multilateral libera
efforts rather than a discriminatory regional liberalization policy. However, after realizing the 
importance of regional economic cooperation from the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
East Asian countries have changed their policy stance from favoring a global approach to 
favoring a regional approach. As in Table 1, among the 29 RTAs implemented or signed 
including East Asian countries, 28 RTAs, excluding the AFTA, have been implemented a
the crisis. Second, most of RTAs in East Asia have taken a form of bilateral negotiation 
similar to the world-wide trend of seeking a cheaper and easier negotiation cost even tho
the gains from freer trade are limited. Third, there has been no distinction between intra- and 
inter-regional partnerships. Recent innovations in information and communication technology
significantly have saved transaction costs and made geographical distance relatively less 
important. Pre-RTA economic interdependence has been more important as we have 
considered the right partners to approach for the formation of a RTA. Fourth, conside
partnership issue of RTAs again, most of East Asian RTAs have been taking the form of hub-
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and-spoke type of overlapping RTAs which may cause a spaghetti bowl phenomenon.7 In 
particular, ASEAN, Singapore, and Thailand have been very aggressive in pursuing being a 
hub. Fifth, there has been very slow progress in making an expansionary path of RTAs which 
may trigger a domino effect of regionalism. The proposed ASEAN+3 RTAs are still under 
consideration as a talking point. 
 
2. Why are RTAs Proliferating in East Asia? 
 
As we mentioned earlier, recognizing the necessity for regional economic cooperation 
for regional economic stability and revitalization of the regional economic dynamism since 
the East Asian financial crisis can be one of the most important market-driven motives found 
in East Asia. The deepening intra-regional interdependence can be another major factor to 
trigger the shift in the policy stance. The intra-regional trade share in ASEAN+3 has been 
steadily rising from 29.4 percent in 1990 to 37.3 percent in 2000, to 38.9 percent in 2005, and 
38.3 percent in 2006.8 
Furthermore, the strong incentives for a country to be a hub of a RTA web make both 
individual Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN as a whole aggressively seek to initiate 
multiple negotiations for RTAs. On the other hand, the fear to be left alone from the world-
wide movement toward regionalism has made most East Asian countries competitively jump 
on the wagon.  
A disappointing outcome produced by multilateral institutions’ efforts for global free 
trade such as the stalled DDA negotiation under the WTO and the sluggish achievement of the 
Bogor Goals under APEC also has pushed East Asia’s pursuit of regional cooperation. 
Leadership competition between China and Japan can be listed as an important political factor 
behind East Asian regionalism. 
 
3. Whither East Asian RTAs? 
 
 Carefully analyzing the recent change in the regional trade pattern of East Asia, Urata 
(2006) finds an increasing trend of intra-regional trade, trade in the manufacturing sector, 
vertical intra-industry trade, and trade in manufacturing parts and components between 
                                            
7 See Bhagwati, Greenaway, and Panagariya (1998) and Panagariya (1999) for the spaghetti 
bowl phenomenon caused by overlapping RTAs. 
8 See Table 1 in Kawai (2007). 
 5
countries in East Asia. Considering the recent changes, we may expect that (i) the rising pre-
RTA intra-regional trade volume will cause a stronger trade creation effect, (ii) the increasing 
volume of trade in the manufacturing sector will improve economic efficiency from having a 
more competitive regional market environment, (iii) the increasing vertical intra-industry 
trade will result in bigger short-term gains from economies of scale, and (iv) the resulting 
trade in manufacturing parts and components that is closely connected to the supply chain and 
higher productivity growth expected from an international division of labor will also enhance 
economic efficiency and bring bigger gains from regional free trade. In sum, the expected 
positive effects of the recent changes in the region can be counted as having more favorable 
conditions for the formation of RTAs in East Asia. By estimating with a gravity regression 
analysis, Lee and Park (2005) and Lee and Shin (2006) support the facts observed in East 
Asia. They argue that most of East Asian RTAs will create more intra-bloc trade, will not 
divert extra-bloc trade, and will lead to global free trade. 
 However, there are some important impediments to be considered. The currently 
proliferating East Asian RTAs have been initiated mostly by the private sector oriented toward 
profit-seeking motives unlike the European case for political and ideological harmonization. It 
makes the formation of an institutional framework for regional integration difficult in East 
Asia. In addition, the hub-and-spoke type of many overlapping RTAs in East Asia could result 
in the spaghetti bowl phenomenon of discriminatory trade blocs that have the potential to be 
stumbling blocs against global free trade. More specifically, Park (2006) quantitatively 
evaluated the effects of the proposed East Asian RTAs by applying a CGE model analysis. 
Park proposed that East Asian RTAs should take an expansionary path, for example an 
ASEAN+3 RTA, to establish a building bloc for global free trade in contrast to competing to 
achieve the first mover advantage or hub self-interest resulting from duplicating or 
overlapping RTAs. Baldwin (2004) and Zhai (2006) have also highlighted the negative 
welfare effect expected from overlapping RTAs in East Asia. Recently, Kawai (2007) and 
Kawai and Wignaraja (2007) suggest that either an ASEAN+3 (the East Asian Summit 
countries) or an ASEAN+6 (including Australia, New Zealand, and India) FTA is a desirable 
economic architecture in East Asia by maximizing the positive gains from trade liberalization 
and minimizing the negative “noodle bowl” effects of regionalism.9 
 
                                            
9 They, however, propose to achieve the bigger trade blocs by utilizing ASEAN as the hub for 
the integration such as the 3 sets of ASEAN+1 FTA which is not desirable based on the 
empirical analysis in this paper. 
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III. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model 
 
 
1. Model and Data 
 
What will be the effect of the proposed East Asian RTAs on each of the East Asian 
countries considered in this paper—ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea? Are there any 
sustainable RTAs or a RTA when we evaluate the possible outcomes? The answers to these 
questions are formed by assessing the macroeconomic aggregate effects of the proposed East 
Asian RTA strategies by applying a traditional static CGE model simulation technique. We 
have adopted a trade-linked multi-sector and multi-country CGE model in order to measure 
the impact of East Asian regional economic integration efforts on welfare, GDP, exports, and 
income terms of trade. We carefully have selected those four aggregate variables to measure 
the effectiveness of proposed strategies by type of RTAs and by the economies considered. 
The equivalent variations of welfare have been selected mainly for the consumption effect, 
GDP is mainly for the production effect. Exports have been chosen for the volume of trade 
effect. Income terms of trade10 is another important measure of welfare change. In addition, 
we report on the effect on imports and bilateral trade pattern to support our findings. 
 The CGE model we describe in this section is the “GTAP6inGAMS” model developed 
by Rutherford (2005). The model has three economic agents: producer, representative consumer 
(private and public), and trading partners. The GTAP6inGAMS model is a traditional static 
Arrow-Debreu type of general equilibrium model in which the zero profit condition and market 
clearance define the equilibrium. The GTAP6inGAMS is a modified version of the GTAP 
model version 6 developed for GAMS users. The current model described in this paper uses a 
classification consisting of 7 sectors and 25 economies the same as Park (2006).11 The model 
solution has been calibrated, with 2001 as the base year, using Global Trade, Assistance, and 
                                            
10 Income terms of a trade measure, the purchasing power of exports in terms of imports, can 
be a better measure of income or welfare effect of price changes in international trade, 
especially for developing countries, relative to the net barter terms of trade. See pp 136-137 in 
Chacholiades (1990). 
11 The 7 sectors are Agricultural Products, Food Products, Extractive Industry, Light 
Manufacturing, Heavy Manufacturing, Technology-intensive Manufacturing, and Services. 
The 27 economies are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, the 
Rest of Southeast Asia, China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, India, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Russia, the United States of America, the European 
Free Trade Association, the Western European Countries, and the Rest of the World. For more 
detailed classification, see Park (2006). 
 7
Production (The GTAP 6 Database)12. The model has been implemented using the GAMS 
MPSGE.13 
 
2. Scenarios 
 
 As introduced by Lee, Park and Shin (2004) and applied to the East Asian case by Park 
(2006), the proliferating RTAs in East Asia will mainly take the following three different paths: 
expansionary RTAs, where the membership of existing RTAs are increasing by attracting new 
members; duplicating (or competing) RTAs where separate RTAs are created between 
nonmembers of existing RTAs and competing with existing RTAs; and overlapping RTAs, 
where some members are focusing on being a hub for the RTAs, by forming multiple 
membership with countries in the region. More specifically, the existing AFTA can be 
expanded to a bigger trade bloc such as an ASEAN+3 RTA. Some RTAs, such as those 
between China-Japan-Korea, will be formed in the near future, by competing with existing 
RTAs such as the AFTA. Some RTAs, similar to the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Korea, and 
ASEAN-Japan RTAs, which will have overlapped membership making the ASEAN a hub of 
East Asian RTAs.  
 In order to quantitatively measure the impacts of the proposed East Asian RTAs on 
welfare, output production, and trade flows for each of the participating countries, members as a 
whole, nonmembers, and the world economy, we empirically designed and tested four 
scenarios. . For each of the scenarios, both import tariffs and export taxes between members 
were eliminated, but the trade barriers between members and nonmembers were retained. The 
scenarios we examine are as follows. 
 
z [AFTA]: An FTA among the ASEAN countries as a reference (the being-left-alone RTA 
strategy) 
z [ASEAN Hub]: Three separate FTAs including an ASEAN-China, an ASEAN-Japan, and 
an ASEAN-Korea FTAs, assuming that the AFTA is effective (the hub-and-spoke type of 
overlapping RTA strategy) 
z [AFTA vs China-Japan-Korea]: Two separate FTAs including the AFTA and a China-
Japan-Korea FTA (the duplicating or competing RTA strategy) 
                                            
12 See Dimaranan and McDougall (2006). 
13 MPSGE (Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium analysis) is a 
subsystem within GAMS. See http://www.gams.com/solvers/mpsge/index.htm. 
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z [ASEAN+3]: An FTA among the ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea (the expansionary 
RTA strategy) 
 
 For the base solution of the model economy, we ran the CGE model without changing 
its initial condition and derived general equilibrium values for each of the economies in the 
model. As a next step, we reran the model under different scenarios and recalculated the 
equilibrium values for each case. Then we compared the different equilibrium values with the 
initial base solution in terms of percentage deviation from the base to evaluate the experimental 
impacts of each scenario on each country. 
 
 
IV. In Search of Sustainable RTAs in East Asia: Scenario Analysis 
 
 
1. Aggregate Effect 
 
 Table 2 provides a comparative summary of aggregate economic effects of the proposed 
East Asian RTAs by type of RTA. The aggregate effect of the currently effective AFTA had no 
significant negative effects for the discriminatory liberalization on the Northeast Asian 
neighbors but produced significant enough positive gains to ASEAN members. However, if 
ASEAN members decided to go further by pursuing the ASEAN Hub scenario which included 
3 sets of ASEAN+1 FTAs, it can remarkably raise the ASEAN’s gains from free trade. The 
ASEAN’s welfare and GDP gains can be raised by over 3 times bigger than that of the AFTA. 
The negative effects on excluded neighbors will be more troublesome even though the 
neighboring countries can increase their exports by the income effect coming from the 
additional GDP gains of ASEAN as shown to be in the increase in bilateral trade volume 
between ASEAN and each of the three Northeast Asian countries. 
 Considering the negative effects expected from AFTA or the ASEAN Hub scenario, the 
Northeast Asian neighbors may decide to form their own regional protection strategy against 
ASEAN by forming a China-Japan-Korea FTA. The trade warfare between the two regions will 
be harmful to the less developed ASEAN economy and will give huge benefit to the Northeast 
Asian countries, especially Korea. However, this duplicating RTA competition may not be 
beneficial to the world economy at all. It will cause much lower welfare gains to the world 
economy than that of the existing AFTA and ASEAN Hub scenario. On the other hand, if those 
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neighboring countries in both Southeast and Northeast Asia cooperate with each other by 
forming an East Asian trade bloc, the so called ASEAN+3 FTA, it will be beneficial to all the 
participating countries except for its negative welfare effect on China. The negative welfare 
effect of all the four proposed East Asian RTAs on China is a very interesting result which is 
also highlighted by Zhai (2006). It can be explained by the heavy and increasing intra-regional 
dependence of imported parts and components to China as a world factory. In addition, East 
Asian RTAs reallocate resources from the manufacturing industry to the agricultural industry 
within China and it may deteriorate economic efficiency of the Chinese manufacturing sector 
resulting in the deterioration of welfare as Zhai (2006) mentioned.  
 In terms of the trade effect including volumes measured by the growth of exports and 
imports, the income terms of trade, and bilateral trade relations, all the proposed East Asian 
RTAs have a positive effect on participating countries and the world economy as a whole. 
 Figure 1 compares the aggregate effects of the four proposed East Asian RTAs on the 
four regional economies in terms of the equivalent variation of welfare, GDP, exports, and 
income terms of trade. The ASEAN gains the most from the existing AFTA and an ASEAN 
Hub scenario. This finding explains why most of the nonmembers of RTAs fear being left alone. 
This fear motivates nonmembers to jump on the RTA band wagon. This finding explains why 
countries are competing to be a hub and making a very complicated overlapping RTA map. 
There is no distinguishing difference in the effects of an AFTA between nonmembers of the 
RTA but the effects of an ASEAN Hub RTA will cause a relatively better effect on China. The 
competing Northeast Asian RTA and the expansionary East Asian RTA will distribute 
relatively more favorable gains to Korea and China when we measure the size of the rectangles. 
The ASEAN will benefit least of the competing and expansionary RTA strategies.  
 Figure 2 illustrates Table 2 by highlighting which scenario is the best for each of the 
economies in East Asia. For the sake of the ASEAN, the ASEAN Hub RTA is the best and 
competing with the Northeast Asian neighbors is the worst scenario. For the three Northeast 
Asian countries, the ASEAN+3 RTA will be the most desirable RTA but it is not much better 
than the Northeast Asian RTA between the three countries competing against the AFTA. Both 
the AFTA and ASEAN Hub RTA will be the worst scenarios for the countries in Northeast 
Asia.  
In search of a sustainable RTA from the proposed four scenarios, Figure 3 illustrates 
the effect of the East Asian RTAs by aggregate economic variables representing each 
country’s welfare. In terms of the equivalent variation of welfare and income terms of trade, 
there is no Pareto efficient RTA among the four different scenarios possible in East Asia. 
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Reallocating resources from an existing AFTA to any alternative trade bloc may hurt at least 
one economy in the region. However, in terms of the GDP, the expansionary ASEAN+3 RTA 
can be a Pareto efficient scenario where the shift from the AFTA to the bigger trade bloc can 
make all the participating economies better off. For export promotion raising trade volume, 
both the ASEAN Hub and the ASEAN+3 RTA can be counted as Pareto improving RTA 
strategies. However, ASEAN+3 is more superior with respect to Pareto efficiency than the 
ASEAN Hub RTA. Even though our search for the Pareto efficient RTA in East Asia has 
proven to be unsuccessful, we still have a partially acceptable Pareto efficient RTA, the 
ASEAN+3 RTA. More interestingly, if we expand the regional liberalization effort toward a 
global level including the Pacific Basin partners, that is, an APEC RTA, the APEC RTA can 
be a Pareto efficient RTA for the economies in East Asia in every aspect we have measured as 
indicated in Table 2. 
 
2. East Asian RTAs in a Globalizing World 
 
 Will the proposed East Asian RTAs be beneficial to the members as a whole and the 
world economy? If not, the proposed East Asian RTAs may not be effective and sustainable. As 
presented in Table 3, all the proposed East Asian RTAs raise world welfare between a 
minimum of 0.21 percent in the case of the competing RTAs, including the AFTA and the 
China-Japan-Korea RTA, and a maximum of 0.98 percent in the case of the ASEAN Hub RTA. 
The GDP gains range from 0.01 percent for the AFTA to 0.57 percent for the ASEAN+3 RTA. 
The world trade volume also rises. The expansionary ASEAN+3 RTA can be evaluated as the 
best strategy for maximizing world output and trade. For the members’ welfare, GDP, and trade 
as in Table 3, the expansionary ASEAN+3 RTA is also the best strategy for East Asian 
participants in terms of creating bigger gains in many aspects and more evenly distributed gains 
between the Southeast and Northeast Asian members. 
 In summary, considering the effects of the ASEAN+3 RTA on members, nonmembers, 
and the world economy relative to other alternative strategies, the partially Pareto efficient East 
Asian RTA─ASEAN+3 FTA─ can be effective and sustainable because the effect on members 
is significantly positive enough and more evenly distributed, the effects on the world welfare is 
positive enough, and the negative effect on nonmembers is not very significant. 
 
3. Sectoral Effect 
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The effect of the proposed East Asian RTAs on output production by sector is 
summarized in Table 4 as supporting material. In terms of domestic output production, Korea 
benefits the most and there are no significant losers. If we focus on the ASEAN+3 RTA, the 
East Asian regional integration restructures the regional industrial structure based on each 
economy’s comparative advantages. ASEAN and China’s primary industries, Japanese 
advanced manufacturing industries, and Korea’s light manufacturing industries will achieve 
more gains. This finding also supports the above-mentioned deteriorated welfare of China 
caused by resource reallocation across industries. 
 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Searching for effective and sustainable RTAs or a RTA for East Asia, we 
quantitatively evaluated the likely effect of the proposed RTA strategies─(i) the AFTA (the 
being-left-alone strategy), (ii) an ASEAN Hub RTA (the hub-and-spoke type of overlapping 
RTA strategy), (iii) the AFTA vs a China-Japan-Korea RTA (the duplicating or competing RTA 
strategy), (iv) an ASEAN+3 RTA (the expansionary RTA strategy)─on East Asian economies 
with respect to the equivalent variation of welfare, GDP, exports, imports, and income terms 
of trade by applying a multi-country and multi-sector CGE model.14 
 From the ex-ante simulation analysis testing for the sustainability of the proposed East 
Asian RTAs and reflected in Table 5, we found that both the duplicating and expansionary RTA 
strategy by forming the Northeast Asian RTA separately from the existing AFTA and the 
ASEAN+3 RTA, respectively, were desirable strategies for both the East Asian economies and 
the world economy. Even though the ASEAN Hub strategy appeared to a better policy option 
for ASEAN and the world economy, it was not necessarily a desirable strategy when we 
considered the neighboring countries in Northeast Asia as spokes. 
                                            
14 There exist some limitations in this research. In addition to the four measures we selected 
for the Pareto efficiency, there are many other important variables to be considered. If we use 
different measures, our conclusion and policy implications may not be valid. Moreover, the 
partial Pareto efficiency may not hold if we consider all the ASEAN members independently. 
These limitations should be carefully considered when we evaluate policy implications in this 
paper. 
 
 12
 We also found that there was no perfectly Pareto efficient RTA among the four different 
scenarios possible in East Asia. However, in terms of the production effect and trade volume 
effect of welfare, the expansionary ASEAN+3 RTA can be a sustainable Pareto efficient 
scenario where the evolution from AFTA to the bigger trade bloc can make all the participants 
better off. Furthermore, when we evaluated the effects of the ASEAN+3 RTA on members, 
nonmembers, and the world economy relative to other alternative strategies, the partially Pareto 
improving East Asian RTA would be more desirable because the members gains were 
significantly positive enough and more evenly distributed between members, the effects on the 
world welfare were also positive enough, and the effect on nonmembers was not strongly 
negative. Moreover, we found that the evolution of the regional RTA to the global level such as 
an APEC RTA, could be a Pareto improvement for the economies in East Asia. 
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Table 1. Major RTAs including Countries in East Asia as of September 2007 
Implemented (year into force) Signed (year of signing) Under Negotiation Under Consideration
Bilateral and Intra-Regional    
China-Hong Kong (2004) China-Pakistan (2006) China-Singapore China-India 
China-Macao (2004) Japan-Philippines (2006) Japan-Indonesia China-Korea 
Japan-Malaysia (2006) Japan-Brunei (2006) Japan-Korea China-Thailand 
Singapore-Japan (2002) Japan-Thailand (2007) Japan-India Japan-Taiwan 
Singapore-India (2005) Thailand-India (2004) Japan-Vietnam Singapore-Bahrain 
Singapore-Korea (2006)  Korea-India Singapore-Sri Lanka 
  Singapore-Kuwait Singapore-UAE 
  Singapore-Pakistan Thailand-Pakistan 
  Singapore-Qatar  
  Thailand-India  
Bilateral and Inter-Regional    
China-Chile (2006) Japan-Chile (2007) China-Australia China-Island 
Japan-Mexico (2005) Korea-US (2007) China-New Zealand Korea-Australia 
Korea-Chile (2002) Thailand-Peru (2005) Japan-Australia Singapore-Moroco 
Singapore-Australia (2003)  Japan-Canada Singapore-Egypt 
Singapore-Jordan (2005)  Japan-Swiss Thailand-Chile 
Singapore-New Zealand (2001)  Korea-Canada  
Singapore-US (2004)  Korea-Mexico  
Singapore-Panama (2006)  Singapore-Canada  
Thailand-Australia (2006)  Singapore-Mexico  
Thailand-New Zealand (2005)  Singapore-Peru  
  Thailand-US  
Plurilateral and Intra-Regional    
AFTA (1992)  ASEAN-India ASEAN+3 
ASEAN-China (2005)  ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-Taiwan 
ASEAN-Korea (2007)  China-GCC China-Japan-Korea 
  Japan-GCC Singapore-GCC 
Plurilateral and Inter-Regional    
Korea-EFTA (2006)  ASEAN-CER ASEAN-EFTA 
Singapore-EFTA (2003)  Korea-EU ASEAN-EU 
  Korea-EU ASEAN-US 
   Korea-MERCOSUR 
   Singapore-EU 
   Thailand-EFTA 
Notes: AFTA - ASEAN Free Trade Area; ASEAN - Association of South East Asian Nations; 
ASEAN+3 - ASEAN plus China, Japan, Korea; CER - Closer Economic Relations between 
Australia and New Zealand; EFTA - European Free Trade Association; EU – European Union; 
GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council; MERCUSOR - Southern Common Market 
Sources: Compiled mainly based on the WTO Web site and http://www.bilaterals.org.
Table 2. The Effects of the Proposed East Asian RTAs on the Participating Economies (% Deviation from the Base) 
 
Bilateral Trade 
Existing RTA Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports 
Income Terms of 
Trade ASEAN China Japan Korea World 
ASEAN 1.06 1.45 2.22 2.90 4.30 23.01 -4.34 -2.86 -3.66 0.15 
China -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.19 -0.04 -4.34  0.26 0.28 -0.13 
Japan -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.21 -0.18 -2.86 0.26  0.30 -0.17 
Korea -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.18 -0.14 -3.66 0.28 0.30  -0.15 
AFTA 
World 0.28 0.02 0.09 0.09  0.15 -0.13 -0.17 -0.15 0.08 
Bilateral Trade 
Overlapping RTA (Hub and Spoke) Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports 
Income Terms of 
Trade ASEAN China Japan Korea World 
ASEAN 3.77 4.78 2.59 5.22 4.21 16.32 51.02 2.13 4.53 2.33 
China -0.58 -0.19 3.23 3.21 5.16 51.02  -2.49 -4.79 3.22 
Japan -0.09 -0.24 0.49 0.02 1.48 2.13 -2.49  0.27 0.27 
Korea -0.33 -0.30 0.23 -0.12 0.91 4.53 -4.79 0.27  0.07 
ASEAN Hub 
World 0.98 0.06 0.29 0.29  2.33 3.22 0.27 0.07 0.24 
Bilateral Trade 
Duplicating (Competing) RTA Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports 
Income Terms of 
Trade ASEAN China Japan Korea World 
ASEAN 0.38 0.89 2.03 2.34 4.02 25.02 -14.35 -6.13 -11.05 -0.48 
China -0.10 2.29 10.49 14.24 15.86 -14.35  58.03 104.06 12.04 
Japan 0.31 1.58 4.40 6.95 6.63 -6.13 58.03  32.53 5.58 
Korea 4.88 3.24 12.13 12.12 15.07 -11.05 104.06 32.53  12.13 
AFTA vs China-Japan-Korea 
World 0.21 0.33 1.16 1.16  -0.48 12.04 5.58 12.13 0.95 
 
 17
 18
 
Table 2. The Effects of the Proposed East Asian RTAs on the Participating Economies (% Deviation from the Base) 
 
 
Bilateral Trade 
Expansionary RTA Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports 
Income Terms of 
Trade ASEAN China Japan Korea World 
ASEAN 2.69 3.77 2.28 4.25 3.89 19.02 33.19 -1.51 -3.27 1.33 
China -0.34 2.17 13.07 16.86 20.44 33.19  53.14 96.68 14.64 
Japan 0.25 1.32 4.77 6.87 8.08 -1.51 53.14  31.29 5.74 
Korea 4.57 2.86 12.13 11.87 15.73 -3.27 96.68 31.29  12.01 
ASEAN+3 
World 0.82 0.36 1.30 1.30  1.33 14.64 5.74 12.01 1.07 
Bilateral Trade 
Global RTA Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports 
Income Terms of 
Trade ASEAN China Japan Korea World 
ASEAN 2.28 4.59 5.19 6.67 10.26 5.24 41.19 9.87 9.68 5.93 
China 0.69 5.49 21.01 28.65 32.23 41.19  36.48 77.21 24.16 
Japan 0.54 2.29 8.04 11.08 13.86 9.87 36.48  19.90 9.44 
Korea 5.10 4.50 13.45 14.39 18.11 9.68 77.21 19.90  13.89 
APEC 
World 1.06 0.78 3.01 3.01  5.93 24.16 9.44 13.89 2.53 
Figure 1. Aggregate Effects of East Asian RTAs by the Type of the RTA 
(% Deviation from the Base) 
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of Trade
AFTA on ASEAN AFTA on China
AFTA on Japan AFTA on Korea
 
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of Trade
ASEAN Hub on ASEAN
ASEAN Hub on China
ASEAN Hub on Japan
ASEAN Hub on Korea
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of Trade
AFTA vs CJK on ASEAN
AFTA vs CJK on China
AFTA vs CJK on Japan
AFTA vs CJK on Korea
 
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of Trade
ASEAN+3 on ASEAN ASEAN+3 on China
ASEAN+3 on Japan ASEAN+3 on Korea
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Figure 2. Aggregate Effects of East Asian RTAs by Economy 
(% Deviation from the Base) 
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of Trade
AFTA on ASEAN
ASEAN Hub on ASEAN
AFTA vs CJK on ASEAN
ASEAN+3 on ASEAN
 
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of Trade
AFTA on China ASEAN Hub on China
AFTA vs CJK on China ASEAN+3 on China
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of
Trade
AFTA on Japan
ASEAN Hub on Japan
AFTA vs CJK on Japan
ASEAN+3 on Japan
 
Welfare (EV)
GDP
Exports
Income Terms of Trade
AFTA on Korea ASEAN Hub on Korea
AFTA vs CJK on Korea ASEAN+3 on Korea
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Figure 3. Aggregate Effects of East Asian RTAs by Measure 
(% Deviation from the Base) 
 
ASEAN
China
Japan
Korea
AFTA on Welfare
ASEAN Hub on Welfare
AFTA vs CJK on Welfare
ASEAN+3 on Welfare
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China
Japan
Korea
AFTA on GDP ASEAN Hub on GDP
AFTA vs CJK on GDP ASEAN+3 on GDP
ASEAN
China
Japan
Korea
AFTA on Exports
ASEAN Hub on Exports
AFTA vs CJK on Exports
ASEAN+3 on Exports
 
ASEAN
China
Japan
Korea
AFTA on Income Terms of Trade
ASEAN Hub on Income Terms of Trade
AFTA vs CJK on Income Terms of Trade
ASEAN+3 on Income Terms of Trade
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Table 3. Effects of the Proposed East Asian RTAs on Regional and Global Economies (% Deviation from the Base) 
 
Bilateral Trade 
Existing RTA Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports Members (ASEAN) Nonmembers World 
Members (ASEAN) 1.06 0.93 2.22 2.90 23.01 -2.84 0.15 
Nonmembers -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -2.84 0.07 -0.15 AFTA 
World 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.15 -0.15 0.08 
Bilateral Trade 
Overlapping RTA (Hub and Spoke) Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports Members ASEAN CJK Nonmembers World 
Members 2.54 0.61 1.81 2.33 10.31 15.55 6.56 -1.50 1.90 
ASEAN 3.77 0.88 2.59 5.22 15.55 16.32 15.24 -6.39 2.33 
CJK -0.33 0.56 1.47 1.05 6.56 15.24 -2.36 0.18 1.72 
Nonmembers -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.13 -1.50 -6.39 0.18 0.09 -0.24 
ASEAN Hub 
World 0.98 0.10 0.29 0.29 1.90 2.33 1.72 -0.24 0.24 
Bilateral Trade 
Duplicating (Competing) RTA Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports Members ASEAN CJK Nonmembers World 
Members 0.78 2.55 6.23 7.89 15.54 0.86 26.04 -3.80 1.77 
ASEAN 0.38 0.85 2.03 2.34 0.86 25.02 -9.08 -1.35 -0.48 
CJK 1.70 2.90 8.02 10.33 26.04 -9.08 62.15 -4.64 2.75 
Nonmembers -0.16 -0.11 -0.22 -0.24 -3.80 -1.35 -4.64 0.34 -0.52 
AFTA vs 
China-Japan-
Korea 
World 0.21 0.51 1.16 1.16 1.77 -0.48 2.75 -0.52 0.95 
Bilateral Trade 
Expansionary RTA Welfare (EV) GDP Exports Imports Members ASEAN CJK Nonmembers World 
Members 2.33 2.89 7.10 9.01 23.12 10.66 32.04 -4.50 3.46 
ASEAN 2.69 0.75 2.28 4.25 10.66 19.02 7.22 -4.81 1.33 
CJK 1.50 3.33 9.16 11.11 32.04 7.22 57.56 -4.39 4.38 
Nonmembers -0.18 -0.14 -0.28 -0.31 -4.50 -4.81 -4.39 0.38 -0.64 
ASEAN+3 
World 0.82 0.57 1.30 1.30 3.46 1.33 4.38 -0.64 1.07 
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Table 4. Sectoral Effects of the Proposed East Asian RTAs (% Deviation from the Base) 
 
Existing RTA Total Output
Agricultural 
Products 
Food 
Products 
Extractive 
Industry 
Light 
Manufacturing
Heavy 
Manufacturing
Technology-
intensive 
Manufacturing
Services 
ASEAN 2.10 -0.37  9.35  0.60  2.53  1.15  1.87  -0.44  
China 0.00 -0.08  -0.08  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.01  
Japan -0.01 0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.05  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  
Korea -0.04 0.00  -0.07  -0.07  -0.25  0.07  0.01  0.02  
ASEAN+3 1.46 -0.27  6.53  0.41  1.74  0.82  1.31  -0.31  
East Asia* 1.20 -0.22  5.35  0.35  1.40  0.67  1.09  -0.25  
Rest of the World -0.01 -0.11  -0.28  0.05  0.01  0.14  0.09  0.01  
AFTA 
World 0.57 -0.16  2.42  0.19  0.68  0.40  0.57  -0.12  
Overlapping RTA (Hub and Spoke) Total Output
Agricultural 
Products 
Food 
Products 
Extractive 
Industry 
Light 
Manufacturing
Heavy 
Manufacturing
Technology-
intensive 
Manufacturing
Services 
ASEAN 2.56 0.57  15.54  3.77  2.68  -3.33  -0.44  -0.90  
China 0.03 -0.47  -0.99  -0.61  0.58  0.91  0.77  0.01  
Japan -0.11 -0.28  -0.87  0.07  -0.42  0.38  0.39  -0.02  
Korea -0.14 -0.16  -0.91  -1.03  -0.10  0.69  0.54  -0.01  
ASEAN+3 1.77 0.31  10.60  2.48  1.89  -2.13  -0.14  -0.64  
East Asia* 1.42 0.29  8.73  1.97  1.48  -1.81  -0.18  -0.52  
Rest of the World -0.03 -0.09  -0.43  -0.01  -0.01  0.19  0.08  0.03  
ASEAN Hub 
World 0.67 0.09  3.97  0.94  0.71  -0.77  -0.05  -0.24  
 
* East Asia in this table includes ASEAN+3, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 
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Table 4. Sectoral Effects of the Proposed East Asian RTAs (% Deviation from the Base) 
 
Duplicating (Competing) RTA Total Output
Agricultural 
Products 
Food 
Products 
Extractive 
Industry 
Light 
Manufacturing
Heavy 
Manufacturing
Technology-
intensive 
Manufacturing
Services 
ASEAN 2.02 -0.59  8.05  0.78  0.95  2.74  2.56  -0.34  
China -0.06 3.15  1.76  -1.77  0.57  -2.43  -1.63  -0.08  
Japan -0.06 -1.76  -0.88  1.07  0.82  0.35  0.04  -0.04  
Korea 7.25 -20.92  53.98  6.73  22.53  -5.28  -5.66  -0.65  
ASEAN+3 2.13 -2.37  11.12  1.15  3.06  1.18  1.07  -0.32  
East Asia* 1.60 -2.00  9.06  0.89  1.82  0.87  0.79  -0.23  
Rest of the World -0.04 -0.57  -0.87  0.14  -0.69  0.94  0.72  0.04  
AFTA vs 
China-Japan-
Korea 
World 0.75 -1.25  3.89  0.50  0.51  0.91  0.75  -0.09  
Expansionary RTA Total Output
Agricultural 
Products 
Food 
Products 
Extractive 
Industry 
Light 
Manufacturing
Heavy 
Manufacturing
Technology-
intensive 
Manufacturing
Services 
ASEAN 2.44 0.36  13.79  3.76  0.86  -1.27  0.30  -0.74  
China -0.06 2.80  0.78  -2.29  0.99  -1.70  -0.95  -0.06  
Japan -0.16 -2.03  -1.65  0.97  0.44  0.78  0.42  -0.06  
Korea 6.93 -21.16  51.50  5.23  22.93  -4.37  -4.95  -0.66  
ASEAN+3 2.38 -1.79  14.72  3.02  3.04  -1.41  -0.34  -0.59  
East Asia* 1.79 -1.49  12.06  2.38  1.80  -1.35  -0.43  -0.46  
Rest of the World -0.06 -0.53  -0.95  0.09  -0.69  0.91  0.68  0.05  
ASEAN+3 
World 0.83 -0.99  5.30  1.19  0.51  -0.17  0.14  -0.19  
 
* East Asia in this table includes ASEAN+3, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 
 
Table 5. The Sustainability Test for RTAs in East Asia 
 
Conditions for the Sustainability Test AFTA ASEANHub 
AFTA 
Vs 
China-
Japan-
Korea 
ASEAN+3 
Consumption (EV of Welfare) + ++ + ++ 
Production (GDP) + +++ + ++ 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports) ++ +++ ++ ++ 
ASEAN 
Terms of Trade (Income TOT) +++ +++ +++ ++ 
Consumption (EV of Welfare)  - - - 
Production (GDP)  - ++ ++ 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports)  ++ +++ +++ China 
Terms of Trade (Income TOT)  +++ +++ +++ 
Consumption (EV of Welfare)  * + + 
Production (GDP)  - + + 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports)  + +++ +++ Japan 
Terms of Trade (Income TOT)  + +++ +++ 
Consumption (EV of Welfare)  - +++ +++ 
Production (GDP)  - ++ ++ 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports)  * +++ +++ 
Individual 
Member 
Economy 
Korea 
Terms of Trade (Income TOT)  + +++ +++ 
Consumption (EV of Welfare) + ++ + ++ 
Production (GDP) + + ++ ++ Members on Average 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports) ++ ++ +++ +++ 
Consumption (EV of Welfare) * * - - 
Production (GDP) * * - - Nonmembers on Average 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports) * - - - 
Consumption (EV of Welfare) + + + + 
Production (GDP) * + + + World Economy 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports) * + + + 
Distribution of Gains Overall Evaluation Between Members  NE NE E 
Consumption (EV of Welfare)  NH NH NH 
Production (GDP)  NH NH H 
Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports)  H NH H 
Pareto Efficiency 
relative to AFTA 
Terms of Trade (Income TOT)  NH NH NH 
 
Notes: + (positive), ++ (significantly positive), +++ (strongly positive), * (insignificant), - 
(negative) where 0.1% ≤ + < 2% ; 2% ≤ ++ < 4% ; 4% ≤ +++ ; -0.1% < * < 0.1% ; -
1% ≤ - ≤ -0.1%. 
E (NE): Evenly (Not Evenly) distributed 
H (NH): Hold (Not Hold) 
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